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Abstract 
The most recent ‘land rush’ precipitated by the convergent ‘crises’ of fuel, feed and food in 
2007–2008 has heightened the debate on the consequences of land investments, with 
widespread media coverage, policy commentary and civil society engagement. This ‘land 
rush’ has been accompanied by a ‘literature rush’, with a fast-growing body of reports, 
articles, tables and books with varied purposes, metrics and methods. Land grabbing, 
as it is popularly called, is now a hot political topic around the world, discussed 
amongst the highest circles. This is why getting the facts right is very important and 
having effective methodologies for doing so is crucial. Several global initiatives have 
been created to aggregate information on land deals, and to describe their scale, 
character and distribution. All have contributed to building a bigger (if not always better) 
picture of the phenomenon, but all have struggled with methodology. This JPS Forum 
identiﬁes a profound uncertainty about  what it is that is being counted, questions the 
methods used to collate and aggregate ‘land grabs’, and calls for a second phase of land 
grab research which abandons the aim of deriving total numbers of hectares in favour of 
more speciﬁc, grounded and transparent methods. 
 
Introduction 
In the current, burgeoning debate on large-scale land deals, numbers matter. There are 
big economic and political stakes at play, and astonishing ﬁgures of ‘millions of hectares’ 
play well in media and policy debates at different levels. But how do we collect reliable 
data on where land deals are taking place, their size, status and state of production? 
How do we assess where investments might be most appropriate, offering the greatest 
returns, given poor existing or baseline information on land use, availability and 
suitability? How do we understand land deals in the context of wider agrarian 
transitions, shifting labour regimes and reconﬁgurations of rural economies? What 
methods are most appropriate? Can crowd-sourcing approaches be effective? How are 
claims validated and cross-checked? What are the wider political implications of such 
data, especially as they become appropriated by different actors? These are just some 
of the questions reﬂected in this JPS Forum. 
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A range of large-scale (global and continental) assessments in the past few years have 
attempted to grapple with questions of the scale and distribution of land deals, including 
the Land Matrix project, as well as the ongoing monitoring of land deals by GRAIN, based 
on media reports, but also inﬂuential reports by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) (Cotula et al. 2009), the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009), Oxfam (2010), the 
Oakland Institute (Daniel and Mittal 2009, Oakland Institute 2011), the International 
Land Coalition (ILC 2011) and the World Bank (Deininger et al. 2011), among numerous 
others.2 The numbers and the cases that have emerged from these efforts have framed 
the debate. 
 
This second JPS Forum on Global Land Grabbing brings together four papers, originally 
presented at the Global Land Grab II International Conference3 organised by the Land Deal 
Politics Initiative (LDPI), and debated at a lively plenary session. This follows the ﬁrst JPS 
Forum on Global Land Grabbing (Borras et al. 2011) which, ahead of the Global Land Grab 
I International Conference, outlined the dimensions of a research agenda to link 
understandings of the current land grab with longstanding questions in critical agrarian 
studies: rural livelihoods and social differentiation, large versus small farm development 
paths, labour regimes, land tenure and resource governance, political organization and 
mobilization, and the location of agriculture within the wider political economy. 
 
In this second JPS Forum, two articles offer insights into the rationales and practices of 
two major initiatives – the Land Matrix (Anseeuw et al. 2013) and GRAIN’s farmlandgrab. 
org database and associated reports and tables (GRAIN 2013). Both initiatives have made 
important and high-proﬁle contributions to the ongoing debate about ‘land grabbing’, but 
each has serious limitations and problems. Some of these are highlighted in two 
subsequent commentaries, one from Carlos Oya (2013), agrarian theorist at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies who works on Africa, and another from Marc Edelman 
(2013), an anthropologist working on Latin America’s economic history at City University 
New York. Both question methodological assumptions pervasive in the land grab 
literature, and ask what distortions might be introduced as a result in our understanding 
and responses. 
 
The Forum therefore centres on a discussion of the methodologies that have been 
chosen to understand patterns and processes of land investment, and the politics of 
evidence that arise from these choices. The focus is on the methods used to identify, count, 
aggregate and understand land deals at global and continental scales, and also how to 
link these macro-level insights to the burgeoning case study literature. 
 
Evidence for policy 
In such a charged setting we must reﬂect deeply on the politics of evidence, and its 
relationship with policy. Knowledge and policy are of course always co-constructed. There 
is never any neat, clean separation of fact from value and context, as suggested by simplistic 
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calls for ‘evidence-based policy’ perspectives (Denzin 2009). As Bruno Latour explains, 
facts have a life in a policy world that is dependent on processes of ‘enrolment’ and 
‘enlistment’ (Latour 1987). Facts have reach and inﬂuence if they have backers. But such 
a social constructivist stance does not mean that data quality, in-depth analysis and rigour 
are irrelevant. Realities out there are just as real; they just get interpreted in different ways. 
In the complex politics of policy debates, it is the interpretive moves that are crucial, and it 
is here that facts get shaped by particular contexts, or historical moments (Jasanoff 1996). 
 
The Land Matrix and GRAIN went about the task of collecting and collating evidence in 
different ways. The Land Matrix partnership, 4  initiated by the International Land 
Coalition (ILC) and building on its other related initiatives,5 adopted a crowd-sourcing 
approach to identifying land deals. Submissions were checked and conﬁrmed, then 
entered into a large database.6 The GRAIN approach was to use Internet searches to 
compile records, largely based on media reports, of land deals internationally,  and 
present these data on a searchable database,7 as well as in occasional reports (GRAIN 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). They both became the ‘go-to’ places for anyone interested in 
the phenomenon, and thus their data gained considerable traction in the broader policy 
debate (Deininger et al. 2011). 
 
Both the Land Matrix and GRAIN have worked over time to improve accuracy, cross- 
checking and veriﬁcation. The Land Matrix initiative emerged from a coalition of research 
and funding organisations, while GRAIN is a civil society organisation. They represent 
diverse interests and have different skills and capacities. 
 
None of the major initial contributions to the wider debate came from exclusively 
academic research. Only now, as more in-depth, slightly longer-term work on the politics 
of land deals begins to emerge, do we have a growing body of academic research on 
the topic, a substantial portion of which has been published in the pages of this journal,8 
and arose from the two major conferences convened on the subject.9 
 
The debates in the Forum reﬂect the ways in which different people, at different 
moments, need to combine in critical, engaged research on an emerging topic. If we 
wait for the in-depth academic research, the prospects of intervening in a fast-moving 
political and policy debate may be long gone. But, equally, if we ignore such research, 
the initial and necessarily more impressionistic results may go unchallenged, untested 
and unveriﬁed, and myths and misunderstandings will arise. In this paper we argue 
that it is important to have both types of research, conducted by a variety of different 
actors. But what is crucial is that they critically engage with each other, and a more 
                                                 
4The Land Matrix partnership members are the International Land Coalition www.landcoalition.org; Centre for Development and 
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(CIRAD) www.cirad.fr; the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) www.giga-hamburg.de; and the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) www.giz.de. 
5Prior initiatives include the Land Reporting Initiative, the Commercial Pressures on Land project, the Land Portal, and the Land 
Observatory. 
6 http://landportal.info/landmatrix 
7 http://www.farmlandgrab.org/ 
8 See: Wolford et al. (2013); Margulis et al. (2013) ; Borras et al. (2013) ; White et al. (2012) ; Mehta et al. (2012) and Fairhead et 
al. (2012). 
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constructive conversation arises, one that helps shape policy directions in ways that are 
informed by evidence in a productive tension. This is the aim of this Forum, and 
indeed has been the focus for the work of the LDPI over the past few years. Challenging 
the experiences of the Land Matrix and GRAIN is not an exercise in academic nitpicking, 
nor one where practitioners are pitched against researchers, but one where important 
debates are raised for everyone involved. 
 
The land rush context 
The last ﬁve years or so have been a very particular context and moment, when the 
phenomenon which has been dubbed ‘land grabbing’ was clearly unfolding rapidly in 
certain parts of the world, potentially with major consequences for both economies and 
livelihoods. Impacts were also potentially far-reaching and irreversible, so any 
intervention in the debate had to occur quickly, prompting an urgent need to inform 
campaigning and policy advocacy at local, national, regional and global levels. This 
was also a process with big political consequences, with major commercial and 
political interests often pitted against unorganised and voiceless land users. It was 
also a debate that quickly gained media exposure, bringing people together – and 
dividing them – in the so-called global North and South. This all presented important 
campaign opportunities for those concerned with the consequences of unfettered 
globalisation. Whatever one’s views about the potential beneﬁts or otherwise of such 
large-scale land deals, ﬁnding out what was happening, where and involving whom was 
a critical and urgent task. Given the limits of existing data, due in part to high levels 
of commercial secrecy around such deals, this was not easy. 
 
The moment therefore brought together a number of actors – researchers, practitioners, 
investors, activists, policy-makers – all eager to ﬁnd out what was going on. It was thus a 
prime context for engaged research. But, as always, those involved came with positions, 
values and politics. Some were explicit about their positionality; others less so. 
GRAIN’s position is very clear: 
 
Let us state this plainly: GRAIN’s aim is not to do neutral research. With an explicit 
political agenda guiding what we choose to focus on and how we use the information, 
our aim is to gather the best and most useful information that can support responses by 
local communities and activist networks. (GRAIN 2013) 
 
Anseeuw et al. (2013) describe the role of the Land Matrix partnership as being ‘to 
promote transparency and open data in decision-making over land and investment, as a 
step towards greater accountability’. Their argument is that with greater transparency in 
data, and public sharing of the database, this will help inform the debate, and help hold 
those with more power – whether investors, national governments, ﬁnanciers, or aid 
donors – to account. Again, the political role of the research is apparent, even if not 
explicitly expressed in the way GRAIN does. 
 
Academics, particularly in the social and policy sciences, have less of a tradition of 
registering their interests and positions in relation to their work. Despite the long 
tradition of academic critique of a positivist position (Fischer 1998, 2003), many 
academics and policy makers continue to express faith in ‘evidence-based policy’. They 
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adopt the view that truth is expected to speak to power (Wildavsky 1987), somehow 
mediated through the presentation of peer-reviewed evidence, rather than through a 
more argumentative process (Fischer and Forester 1993, Hoppe 1999). 
 
But how do data and other sources of evidence actually engage with policy in practice, 
particularly in the context of a highly charged, and often emotive, debate? The next section 
reﬂects on this relationship. 
 
Engaging with policy: the role of data 
How have data been presented in the policy debate? We have already mentioned the media 
catalogue produced by GRAIN and the database by the Land Matrix, but other reviews have 
made use of these sources, and presented them as an authoritative picture, with the 
headline ﬁgures in particular often grabbing the headlines. 
 
Often on the basis of the same, limited sources, very different conclusions are drawn. The 
World Bank study found that, during 2009, investors expressed interest  in  56 million 
hectares of land in less than a year (Deininger et al. 2011, xxxii), while the ILC (2011) 
indicated the ﬁgure was 80 million (White et al. 2012, 620). In another publication the 
same year, Oxfam (2011, 2) stole headlines with the claim that 227 million hectares was 
leased or sold in developing countries (although their calculation began in 2001). Burrow- 
ing into the footnotes, reasons for the discrepancies can be found: for example, in some 
cases all ‘reported’ cases were included, while in others only ‘conﬁrmed’ ones were. 
Few assess whether anything is actually happening on the ground, and most reports offer 
very few insights into overall impacts, either positive or negative. 
 
The World Bank report (and later Deininger and Byerlee 2012) combined these global 
assessments of land investment with an analysis of land availability and suitability based on 
satellite imagery developed by the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) based in Vienna (Fischer and Shah 2010). This offered a classiﬁcation of countries 
according to four types: ‘little land for expansion, low yield gap’ (Type 1); ‘suitable land 
available, low yield gap’ (Type 2); ‘little land available, high yield gap’ (Type 3); ‘suitable 
land available, high yield gap’ (Type 4) (Deininger et al. 2011, xxxv–xxxvii). Flawed 
assumptions about land uses, and reliance on unveriﬁed land deal data, combined one 
disputed set of data with another, to come up with a typology with an illusion of validity – 
the ‘syndrome of false precision’, as Oya (2013) calls it – informing a set of quite concrete 
recommendations, which gained traction through the authority of the report’s origin, the 
World Bank. 
 
As both Edelman and Oya note in their commentaries, these sources of contradictory 
evidence, based often on shaky data sets, made any considered debate about policy 
implications very difﬁcult. This remains the case, as we actually still don’t know how many 
land deals have been entered into, where and with what consequences. Despite the 
‘literature rush’ that Oya identiﬁes, and the proliferation of case studies, media reports, 
databases and so on, how can we still be in such a position? The papers in this Forum 
point to some of the reasons. 
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First is the ﬁxation on ‘the killer fact’: the number that sways the debate, gains the 
media proﬁle and is in the top line of the press release. This is understandable but 
clearly problematic, especially when such ‘facts’ diverge so dramatically – for example, 
when estimates of hectares being transacted vary from 43 million to four times that, and 
are often compared, even though they refer to different types of transactions, with 
information obtained through different methods, and relate to different time periods. 
While it is inevitable that the media will pick up on such elements of a story, no 
matter how many caveats, researchers need perhaps to be more aware of the 
consequences of their fact-building enterprises in this 24-hour media world. Oya 
(2013,)   quotes Oxfam’s policy advisor, Duncan Green, who cautions, ‘don’t “[u]se a 
killer fact that is not credibly sourced, even if it ﬁts your message. It is not worth 
damaging your credibility for a quick hit. And remember – if in doubt, leave it out!”’ This 
warning has not always been heeded. Second is the way inappropriate inferences are 
derived from ‘data’. Apparently ‘empty’, ‘underutilised’ land viewed by satellite image 
analysts in Austria may look very different when looked at from the ground, where land 
is often occupied, used and governed in ways not visible via the gaze from space. Equally, 
land deals are not synonymous with productive use; data from case studies suggest that 
many have not been put into production by the  investor,  although  in  other  cases,  land  
deals  do  result  in  productive  use,  with employment and other economic linkages being 
generated, beneﬁting substantial numbers of people and/or displacing others. The 
problem, again, is that data on registered interest in land are not good indicators of use 
and impact. 
 
Third is the issue of sources and their quality. As Edelman notes, every researcher 
should be ‘obligated to account for the existence of the source she or he employs. Who 
created it and why? What were the circumstances and context of its production? What 
accounts for its preservation, its location in an archive or its diffusion? What does it say 
and what are its silences?’ (2013,) This sort of rigorous reﬂection has often been absent. 
Ward Anseeuw et al. (2013,) reﬂect on this in respect of the Land Matrix: 
 
the new version of the Land Matrix will show the negotiation and implementation status 
of each deal, also allowing ﬁltering by status. In addition, it will include separate 
categories like “expression of interest” in land, “negotiations failed” and “project 
abandoned”, giving an indication of the scale of interest in land acquisition and allow 
tracking of changes to deals over time’. 
 
Each piece of information will directly be related to its source, enabling a reader to ﬁlter 
deals by the type of source (e.g. media report, research paper, company source, crowd- 
sourcing etc.). Thereby, users can judge themselves whether they consider the information 
reliable. 
 
Fourth are selection biases. Due to the differential availability of information and the 
ﬂocking instincts of researchers, NGOs and media commentators alike, there are often 
severe selection biases – by region (with an apparent bias towards Africa), by country 
(perhaps Ethiopia with lots of reports and high-proﬁle cases), by investor country 
(seemingly always China, at least in the Western press), by origin (foreign investors 
highlighted over domestic partnerships), and by scale (with a bias towards counting a 
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few ‘big’ deals over many small deals). This imposes biases as data are aggregated up, and 
may generate further misunderstandings. If the aggregate data is skewed, it means that 
any statistical analysis is meaningless, and the database is no basis for choosing cases, 
or deﬁning a sampling frame – or for donor or policy interventions. 
 
Fifth are issues surrounding the review process. Rigour, authority and reliability are 
supposed to be checked by claims being subject to review, either by a formal peer 
review process as in the academic literature, or more open styles of review and response. 
Oya comments that a number of publications offer ‘a mix of actual facts, perceptions, 
intentions, rumours, guesstimates’ (2013). Sources are variable too, mixing media 
reports, crowd-sourcing and more detailed case studies and ﬁeld enumeration. In 
terms of the limits of formal review, Edelman comments on a recent piece in the 
prestigious Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Rulli et al. 2013), that 
claims to assess the extent of water resources appropriated through land grabs. But, 
despite the supposedly rigorous review, closer examination discloses serious ﬂaws. As 
Fred Pearce comments in the New Scientist, ‘The ﬁndings would be best ignored, except 
they are the only peer-reviewed global water grab assessment in existence and are 
already being quoted’ (Pearce 2013) – and will be again now! Whatever the review 
process, there needs to be some level of assurance that the data and analysis presented is 
rigorous and reliable. In a context where data are shaky and analysis heavily conditioned 
by authors’ stances, this is challenging, but not impossible, and requires perhaps 
greater attention than has been afforded to date – in top-rank peer reviewed journals 
and non-governmental organisation (NGO) and donor reports alike. These patterns 
show the extent of academics’ reliance on NGOs for data in this recent literature rush on 
land deals. 
 
Sixth, the rapidity of easy access to ‘data’ and the dangerous allure of Google have 
facilitated the recycling of facts long after their sell-by date. Reliance on often outdated 
web sources has led to a circularity of referencing, producing a meta-discussion of land 
deals quite ungrounded in on-the-ground veriﬁcation. The result has been circular 
referencing, reproduction of discredited data and double-counting of deals, as 
exempliﬁed in Locher and Sulle’s (2013) meticulous unpicking of the dodgy data on 
Tanzania. With a call for ground-truthing, new norms of presenting traceable data and 
making available sources and specifying effective dates of data-gathering, they caution 
against academics (or anyone else for that matter) relying on shoddy modes of 
knowledge production while showing just how widespread this has been. 
 
Seventh, and most profoundly, is the unresolved question: what is a ‘land grab’? A register 
of interest, a land deal proposed and concluded, an actual enclosure and resulting dis- 
possession, the actual conversion of enclosed land to new uses, the consequences of some 
or all these developments for employment, incomes and community life? Each of these 
stages in the process of land grabbing needs to be documented, as carefully as possible. 
The problem is that data on different steps have often been aggregated together. Whatever 
protocols and improvements are generated for data gathering and veriﬁcation will be 
meaningless if non-equivalent data is aggregated because we are not agreed on what is 
being counted. 
 
8 
 
 
General policy narratives 
Accuracy, rigour, cross-checking and being honest about sources is essential for any 
research, from whatever provenance. But we also must remember that much of this 
research is not research for its own sake. It is very much geared to inﬂuencing policy, 
raising the proﬁle of an issue, generating debate, sharing information, and inﬂuencing 
decisions. The growing body of formal and informal literature, from all sources, has 
indeed had a major impact, and over quite a short period, notably on the G8’s launch of a 
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (White House 2012). 
 
For example, there is now wide concern about transparency and accountability in land 
investments, rising to the top of the G8 Agenda this year. Also, the Voluntary Guidelines on 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security were approved at the Committee on Food Security in May 2012 
(FAO 2012). Given the divergent positions of those involved, this was an extraordinary 
achievement, made possible by the strength of shared concerns for a more effective 
policy framework. And in national and regional settings across the globe, governments, 
civil society groups and indeed investors are debating how to address the challenges 
raised by this work.10 
 
All research, from whatever source, carries with it a politics. Policy narratives – story- 
lines about the world that frame the problem and suggest a solution – are always under- 
pinned by particular knowledge claims, supported by evidence and data. Here science 
and policy become deeply intertwined, one mutually informing the other. But narratives 
are not neutral statements; they are associated with particular interests, and deployed 
towards particular ends. Evidence can be captured, spun, selectively presented and 
interpreted in certain ways. 
 
Thus NGO campaigns may need a media-grabbing number, usually one that is 
sufﬁciently large to attract attention. This in turn may create a narrative about how 
land grabs are ‘as big as x [small European] countries combined’ (or some other 
equivalent unit), and this generates the story. This generates interest among 
politicians, generates concern among the public, and mobilises activists, and of course 
the public support that helps keep the organisations going. The ‘fact’ may or may not be 
true, but the narrative gains power almost independently. 
 
This ploy is not restricted to NGO campaigners. The same goes for investors, who 
equally deploy different versions of a ‘scarcity’ narrative to their own ends.11 They argue 
that the world is running out of food, and that certain areas of the world have plenty of 
land, and that this justiﬁes investment. They also proﬁt from this ‘manufacture’ of scarcity, 
as land prices rise through speculation (McCarthy and Wolford 2011, Merian Research and 
CRBM 2010, Oxfam 2011). Others too may beneﬁt from narratives that point the blame, 
sometimes selectively or inaccurately, towards others. China, for example, has been 
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academics from across east and southern Africa on the voluntary guidelines, held in Kigali in February 2013. 
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 See for instance Afgri (2013) and InvestAg Savills (2011), as examples of such narratives. 
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singled out as a rapacious land grabber, when in fact this is not true (Brautigam and 
Ekman 2012). Although investment plans exist, and major infrastructural developments 
are underway, China has not ‘grabbed’ large tracts of land for investment in Africa. 
Such narratives of blame serve real interests, including those of domestic elites in alliance 
with other investors, for whom such narratives serve as a major public relations boost, 
diverting attention elsewhere. 
 
Fact building, and the creation of associated narratives, must therefore be seen as a 
social and political process, whereby certain people, institutions and networks are enlisted. 
As such processes of enrolment occur, a particular narrative can hold sway in policy until it 
is upset by competing alternatives. The struggle over which narrative is at the centre is thus 
intensely political, and so reﬂects interests and power differences between actors. In some 
cases, unlikely alliances and unusual compromises can be brokered, as, for example, in the 
agreement over the Voluntary Guidelines, but such a document has to opt for an inclusive, 
compromise narrative, whereby disputes are set aside and language neutralised (Stone 
1988, Shore and Wright 1997). 
 
As sociologists of science have long argued (Jasanoff 1996, Jasanoff and Wynne 1998), all 
knowledge building must be understood in this way, and the interests associated with 
different forms of evidence must be taken into account – whether a database by an 
NGO, a report with the World Bank imprint, or a peer reviewed article by a professor 
from London or New York. This does not abandon a concern with reality, but accepts 
that interpretations are inevitably and always conditioned and socially constructed. 
 
Framing assumptions 
As both Oya and Edelman point out in their contributions, there are many problematic 
framing assumptions involved in the land grab debate, all of which colour interpretations 
– and ultimately actions – in important ways. Being aware of these, and challenging 
them, is an important part of any rigorous analysis. 
 
First is the focus on land areas, and the numbers of hectares. A concentration of data 
collection on this frames the problem in a particular way. But what about issues of land 
quality, value or location, for example, rather than just extent? And who has an incentive 
to tell a researcher about their land holdings? Some may wish to hide their land holdings, 
fearing taxation or expropriation; some may be part of formal registration schemes, while 
others, with scattered and small land holdings, are not; others may simply not know or care 
about how many hectares they ‘own’, as it is family or communal land, held by numerous 
people. The reality is intensely ‘messy’, as Edelman points out with fascinating examples 
from Costa Rica. 
 
A focus on land area of course frames the debate in terms of ownership, tenure and 
title, and so creates a politics of measurement, legibility and control (Scott 1998). 
Measuring, deﬁning and registering hectares through processes of cadastral surveys, 
land registration and land title have a differential impact on the rich and the poor. As 
Edelman notes: 
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If the poor may cultivate illegibility about the land areas they control, the wealthy seek to 
make their own areas legible for the purposes of obtaining legal guarantees (registration, 
leases, etc.) while simultaneously cultivating illegibility about ownership (as noted above) 
through the use of corporate holding companies, subsidiaries and cut-outs. Both of these 
zones of illegibility pose signiﬁcant challenges to land deal researchers. (2013,) 
 
At the same time, quantitative renderings of land deals suggest an authority, a 
mathematical precision, belied by the messiness of their collection. Statistics, 
particularly around something as sensitive as land, exert a form of governmentality, 
ordering the world in favour of a particular hierarchy of power. Statistical services, 
cadastres and tax ofﬁces have long been central to state control and ordering (Hacking 
1990, 1999, Scott 1998). And today, perhaps inadvertently, the new statistical 
databases, available on the Internet, and produced by very different players, have a 
similar effect, exerting power through measurement. As Edelman notes, ‘Every dataset 
has an implicit epistemology behind it.  Different kinds of datasets are created for  
different  administrative, bureaucratic, political or other purposes and always contain 
systematic biases’ (2013,). Another way the debate is framed, inﬂuencing in turn the way 
data are collected and evidence is processed, is through dichotomous contrasts, as Oya 
points out. These may miss the point, and obscure some of the key issues. So, if 
simply framed in terms of returns to land (as in the old inverse size-productivity 
relationship debate), for example, the contrast between ‘small farms’ and ‘large farms’ 
may miss the consequences for employment, livelihoods and off-farm economies of a 
mix of farm sizes in an area, and the real beneﬁts of a commercial sector to a regional 
economy. Equally, the focus on the own-farm ‘peasant’ producer may miss out on wider 
questions of labour where, particularly if a gender lens is added, paid employment on 
larger farms may offer greater livelihood opportunities than toiling on a small plot under 
exploitative, patriarchal conditions. And an emphasis on ‘foreign’ land grabbers may 
similarly deﬂect attention from the role of domestic elites, and the way capital ﬂows 
between overseas and domestic business and political interests. 
 
These frames therefore build on the biases that emerge from data collection and 
presentation. By not looking at regional economic linkages, or avoiding the labour 
question, research may end up failing to address impacts, beyond indicating a certain 
number of hectares that have been appropriated (or were under negotiation), and a 
certain number of households that have been dispossessed. These data of course are still 
valid, but tell only part of the story and feed only a certain narrative. The result, Oya 
argues, is that a ‘neo- populist’ pro-smallholder farmer, anti-labour, anti-foreign 
investment narrative evolves, and alternative frames do not get a look in. 
 
Styles of research: what is appropriate? 
Work on ‘land grabbing’ has reached a critical juncture. The early urgency of the 2008– 
2012 period has perhaps passed, the debate has deﬁnitely risen up the political agenda, 
and now there is a need to reﬂect, challenge and reframe, nuancing and sometimes 
confronting existing narratives. 
 
Both Edelman and Oya argue strongly for the need for long-term, detailed, empirical 
research, based on painstaking, rigorous analysis of the data. They point out the real 
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challenges of researching land issues, and the controversies that surround naming land 
sizes or discussing tenure. They argue for establishing baselines, counterfactuals, 
comparative frames and careful sampling to gain rigorous data that are credible and 
authoritative. They contrast this research mode with ‘quick and dirty’ research, 
involving fast fact- ﬁnding missions and rapid assessments. They also critique the 
practice of putting unchecked data into the public domain, with veriﬁcation expected to 
come later. They would prefer, it seems, a much more slow, deliberate and thorough 
approach.  Oya argues for 
 
being patient and spending more time to collect high-quality evidence on process, actors 
and impact and systematically dealing with biases, lies, imprecise ﬁgures and mistakes 
that are unfortunately common in any research dealing with land use, labour and 
production in devel- oping countries. (2013,) 
 
Certainly there are real dangers of false precision (where ‘facts’ are presented as concrete 
and undisputed, yet their basis is dubious) and there are even bigger problems with 
straight inaccuracies, mistakes and (worse) active distortions. At the same time, we must 
be cognisant of the way in which debates in the fast-moving, real world are actually 
shaped. The contributions of GRAIN, the Land Matrix and others, despite their 
limitations, have been substantial and important. Rough-and-ready, quick-and-dirty 
work of this sort is, under certain conditions, necessary. 
 
This methodological discussion reﬂects a long-running debate in applied development 
studies, where calls for appropriate imprecision, optimal ignorance and proportionate 
accuracy (Chambers 1981, 1983) are pitched against the alternatives which are deemed 
to be ‘long and lost’ anthropology and the type of ‘survey slavery’ where the results 
never see the light of day. In 1981, Robert Chambers argued for a ‘fairly quick and 
fairly clean’ approach, which then became known as ‘rapid rural appraisal’ (Chambers 
1981). This was an attempt to ﬁnd a balance between extended multi-year ﬁeld 
immersions, detailed and very expensive monographs, and ﬂoods of arcane data and 
statistics which dominated academic outputs then as now, and the rapid roadside 
consultancy with all its rural biases (Chambers 1983). 
 
In some ways we see a similar contrast being played out now. But the resolution of the 
earlier discussion was not an either/or choice, but a mix. Rapid appraisal had its place, as 
did well-designed surveys and long-term qualitative ﬁeldwork. The same applies today. 
There is a need for complementary efforts and, crucially, for the different sources of 
evidence – and their associated frames – to speak to each other. So, yes, the rapid 
collection and collation of data have very important uses, especially when we need to 
know about things quickly. But their level of imprecision must be appropriate, and the 
caveats need to be clearly highlighted. Triangulation and checking have always been 
hallmarks of good rapid appraisal, and should be part of the current efforts too. And 
such processes need to give a broad, and necessarily rough, picture, but should avoid 
boiling down to singular facts (or ‘factoids’). Researchers also need to be more careful 
in engagements with the media and policy, to avoid the emergence of simplistic – or 
simply inaccurate – narratives. Long-term, detailed case study work is certainly an 
ideal complement. It allows us to dig deeper, sample more effectively, triangulate better, 
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and develop more comparative insights. But, perhaps most especially, such work allows us 
to ask new questions which can help reframe the debate, and recast the rapid data 
collection exercises. Therefore, one approach is not necessarily wrong, just insufﬁcient. 
 
In addition to the discussion about the types and pace of data collection, another long- 
running methodological debate is also raised: the question of what type of evidence is 
appropriate. This goes beyond the hackneyed qualitative versus quantitative debate (of 
course a mixed method approach always makes sense), to thinking about the form and 
medium for evidence collecting and portrayal. In addition to the more conventional 
forms of data, how do personal testimonies, video and photographic records, case studies 
and histories ﬁt in? Rather than a tyranny of statistics produced, processed, analysed and 
veriﬁed by outsiders, how can local participants have a say? Can those involved in land 
deal processes be part of the knowledge building? Advocates of participatory action 
research (Fals Borda and Rahman 1991), argue that this is an essential route to gaining 
authentic, subaltern perspectives, with research linked to action. This is not a passive 
form of participation, whereby villagers provide information to outsiders, but one 
where those not normally accredited as ‘researchers’ become more centrally involved. 
While there has been much talk of ‘crowd-sourcing’ data, this perspective takes a 
different angle, one not really pursued in the discussions in this Forum, but something 
worth considering – namely, researchers being conduits for local voices rather than 
replacing them. 
 
Today, with greater levels of education and access to the new media, many more people can 
be ‘researchers’. The elitism of academia is being challenged, and it is perhaps incumbent 
on those with the experience and training in research approaches to engage more fully 
with this wider diversity of research players (Edelman 2009). If we keep to our ivory 
towers, and our slow and patient processes of fact building, we may be left hopelessly 
behind. A new story or fact can be tweeted from a remote location, and be promoted, 
ampliﬁed, and spread through the new media at an extraordinary pace. Interactions and 
conversations between different players are essential: all are part of a new, potentially 
highly productive mix. 
 
Critical, engaged research 
What next steps are suggested by the debate generated in this Forum? What should 
‘critical, engaged research’ on land investments look like? 
 
All those involved need to be explicit about politics and framings. We must be trans- 
parent about our data and accountable for our ﬁndings. We must reach out to different 
researchers and diverse audiences. We must facilitate critical dialogue and debate about 
ﬁndings, between all parties. In sum, we must not naïvely expect facts simply to speak 
to power, but become involved in the policy debate, maintaining rigour while facilitating 
debate. 
 
But also, such engagement requires the important quality of reﬂexivity: around position, 
identity, politics, ideology and other biases. Much of this again centres on methodological 
choices, and the ways that knowledge is produced. By claiming authorship, we claim 
power, and we need to be clear about the responsibilities of this. Reﬂexivity also requires 
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open conversation and respectful debate: challenge and confrontation, as well as dialogue 
and deliberation. The Cornell conference, and the panel from which the papers in 
this Forum arose, was one such space, and there need to be many others where academics, 
practitioners, policy-makers, investors and others can meet, listen, debate, challenge and 
learn. Without doubt, in the last ﬁve years, the collective endeavours of a huge array of 
researchers from a diversity of organisations, both within and outside academia and with 
important alliances between groups, have raised the proﬁle of an issue, presented data, 
debated the consequences and had substantial impact on the policy debate, at both global 
and national levels. In a sense, this has indeed been critical, engaged research at its best. 
Yet, we argue, we are at the end of the era of the ‘killer fact’; aggregating total hectarage 
to describe the scale of land deals has been crucial to placing the issue of land grabs on the 
public and policy map, but this exercise has largely run its course. 
 
The past ﬁve years have represented, in important ways, new pathways of knowledge 
building. Research has had to respond to a fast-moving context, operating in real time. 
Information had to be publicly available soon after the research took place, to allow for 
response, but also triangulation, correction and validation. This offered opportunities, 
therefore, for a wider, more inclusive process of peer review, including by activists and 
others on the ground. Conferences and workshops have provided opportunities for 
discussion of results, and wider synthesis, and these have often been characterised by a 
diversity of participants, including academics, ﬁeld practitioners, activists, and policy-
makers, all in the same room, discussing, reviewing, critiquing and making sense of the 
data. This has not been the slow, painstaking generation of evidence, academic peer 
review and publishing where ﬁeld data may appear years after it was collected. That 
mode, where the routines are ﬁxed, the pace slow and the peer review community 
narrow, seems inappropriate and outdated for this sort of issue. Instead, research on 
land deals has been fast, intense and grounded in a commitment to open data. With a 
philosophy of data transparency, accountability and sharing, much of the material has 
been available open source via the Internet. Some academic journals too – including most 
notably this one – have recognised the importance of this, perhaps especially for this 
debate, and have offered free access to articles, where data normally sits behind paywalls 
for long embargo periods. 
 
Different modes of research are appropriate for particular moments. All are co-
constructed with policy and politics, and when issues are urgent, fast-moving and requiring 
a response, then one approach is needed; as we reﬂect, analyse and produce deeper 
understandings, new approaches may be more appropriate. The functions of academic 
research are vital, but must not be obscured by language, access or rareﬁed and narrow 
debates, and above all must engage in a critical dialogue, if injustices are to be challenged 
and improved policy frameworks are to be forged. 
 
A new phase of land grab research is now needed, which builds on the ﬁrst phase dis- 
cussed in this Forum, reﬁnes methods, concepts and criteria, and establishes new norms 
and systems for sampling, recording and updating information. Such a new, open, 
engaged process of collaborative research and review will require new research ethics, 
processes, protocols and checks. These have yet to be deﬁned, but examples are already 
emerging of innovations in this area, the second phase of the Land Matrix being an 
14 
 
example. As research on the ‘land rush’ continues and deepens, more critical dialogue 
is needed among NGOs, other civil society formations and academics on conceptual, 
political and methodological questions that can underpin the co-production of data. 
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